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that no one can possibly know are true or not. All that matters is the 
outcome: 
[A bullshitter] is neither on the side of the true nor on the side of the false. 
His eye is not on the facts at all, as the eyes of the honest man and of the 
liar are, except insofar as they may be pertinent to his interest in getting 
away with what he says. He does not care whether the things he says 
describe reality correctly. He just picks them out, or makes them up, to 
suit his purpose.6
Lawyers are bullshitters, too. And lawyers utilize bullshit for 
the same reason politicians do—to persuade someone to select them. 
Politicians want a vote; lawyers want a client. A divorce attorney 
might claim their standard prenuptial agreement is bulletproof.7 A
lawyer–lobbyist might claim his or her connections on Capitol Hill, 
and no one else’s, are the right connections to push through 
legislation benefitting a potential client.8 A lawyer might tell a 
potential client—one who is dissatisfied with his current counsel and 
is shopping around for another—that the lawyer will win the appeal 
while current counsel will not. A lawyer might claim during oral 
argument before the Supreme Court that there will be dramatic and 
widespread consequences if the Court rules against the lawyer’s 
client. If at the moment an attorney makes these representations, he 
or she does not know if the representations are true, or even likely to 
be true (and in most instances here the lawyer simply cannot know), 
then the lawyer is bullshitting. Lawyers will likely respond to my 
claim that they are bullshitting by arguing that they are merely 
stating a legal opinion based on their education and experience and, 
at worst, are merely engaging in a little harmless puffery.9 Lawyers 
that are outside counsel for corporate entities may make the 
additional claim that in-house counsel is there to protect corporate 
clients from bad lawyering and bullshit promises. Lawyers peddling 
bullshit to judges may argue that judges are lawyers, and so are their 
clerks, and so their professional training and experience will allow 
them to cut through the bullshit and reach the truth. Conflicts 
                                                     
6. Id. at 56. 
7. See INTOLERABLE CRUELTY (Universal Pictures 2003). 
8. Cf. Lerman, supra note 1, at 722 (“Some lawyers deceive clients about 
the extent of their professional contacts or access to influential people.”).
9. See id. at 721 (“Many lawyers do not consider what they characterize as 
‘puffing’ to be lying; they espouse a ‘macho philosophy’ that they ‘can learn 
anything in a week,’ and therefore, that any representations they make about 
expertise will be true in a negligible amount of time. Puffing does not harm clients, 
they argue, because usually they do not bill clients for time spent learning new law, 
or ‘study time.’” (footnote omitted)).
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INTRODUCTION 
While it is well established that lawyers may not lie to their 
clients,1 it is not well established whether counsel can bullshit their 
potential and active clients. 
I do not mean bullshit as a “term of abuse,” but rather as 
philosopher Harry Frankfurt meant it: 
[A bullshitter] cannot be regarded as lying; for she does not presume that 
she knows the truth, and therefore she cannot be deliberately promulgating 
a proposition that she presumes to be false: Her statement is grounded 
neither in a belief that is true nor, as a lie must be, in a belief that it is not 
true. It is just this lack of connection to a concern with truth—this 
indifference to how things really are—that [is] . . . the essence of bullshit.2
Bullshit is most easily defined in contrast to lies, in that a liar is a 
person who knows the truth and intentionally deceives the listener 
about it. For Frankfurt, “Telling a lie is an act with a sharp focus[,] 
. . . designed to insert a particular falsehood at a specific point in a 
set or system of beliefs, in order to avoid the consequences of having 
that point occupied by the truth.”3 A lawyer might lie through “overt 
misstatements and deliberate omissions or failures to disclose 
information” to a client or potential client.4 A bullshitter is recklessly 
indifferent about the truth. 
Frankfurt identified politicians and public relations (PR) 
professionals as examples of modern day bullshitters.5 Politicians 
and PR professionals care only about reaching their goals, and while 
that may include telling lies, it definitely includes making statements 
                                                     
1. “Lawyers are not supposed to lie to their clients. Ever.” Lisa G. Lerman, 
Lying to Clients, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 659, 661 (1990). 
2. HARRY G. FRANKFURT, ON BULLSHIT 2, 33-34 (2005) (originally 
published in 6 RARITAN Q. REV. 81 (1986)). The academic study of bullshit is an 
ongoing inquiry. E.g., Robert A. Levin & Michael J. Zickar, Investigating Self-
Presentation, Lies, and Bullshit: Understanding Faking and Its Effects on Selection 
Decisions Using Theory, Field Research, and Simulation, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF 
WORK: THEORETICALLY BASED EMPIRICAL RESEARCH 253 (Jeanne M. Brett & Fritz 
Drasgow eds., 2002) (studying utility of “response distortion,” including bullshit, on 
potential employers by job candidates); Curtis Bridgeman & Karen Sandrik, Bullshit 
Promises, 76 TENN. L. REV. 379 (2009) (studying bullshit promises made in written 
contracts); Philip Eubanks & John D. Schaeffer, A Kind Word for Bullshit: The 
Problem of Academic Writing, 59 C. COMPOSITION & COMM. 372, 374 (2008) 
(“[O]ur culture often singles out academe as the mother lode of bullshit.”).
3. FRANKFURT, supra note 2, at 51. 
4. Lerman, supra note 1, at 663. 
5. FRANKFURT, supra note 2, at 22-23.  
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between in-house counsel and outside counsel often arise from the 
fact “that a fundamental and pervasive conflict of interest exists 
between lawyer and client—the lawyer’s profit motivation.”10
Moreover, there appears to be an additional conflict between the 
Supreme Court specialists and the tribal client—the specialist’s 
interest in enhancing his credibility before the Supreme Court 
independent of any individual client’s interests.11
In American Indian law and policy, to be sure, lawyers are not 
the only bullshitters—elected tribal officials are politicians and many 
of them are bullshitters as well. Tribal leaders may make election 
promises to bring tribal gaming per capita payments back up to pre-
Great Recession levels. Tribal leaders may make promises to cleanse 
certain families from the tribal membership rolls. Tribal leaders may 
promise to open up a second casino in a metropolitan market that 
will make the tribe flush with cash. Politicians are expected to make 
promises like this, even if they are bullshit much of the time. 
There is potentially a third source of bullshit—in-house 
counsel.12 In-house counsel might tell tribal officials that the 
employee handbook they cut and paste from another tribal 
government’s handbook is bulletproof. In-house counsel might tell 
tribal council members that firing the woman from accounting who 
claimed her supervisor sexually harassed her will not result in 
liability to the tribe or its officers. In-house counsel might claim that 
the tribe’s immunity will absolutely prevent the state from shutting 
down the tribe’s off-reservation casino. In-house counsel might 
bullshit opposing counsel in contract negotiations by agreeing in the 
contract to resolve disputes in federal court. However, as readers will 
see later in this paper, I may be wrong to label these representations 
bullshit. In-house counsel’s motivation is often but not always to 
protect its livelihood under difficult circumstances and competing 
pressures from clients and the bar.13
                                                     
10. Id. at 671. 
11. See Aaron Tang, The Ethics of Opposing Certiorari Before the Supreme 
Court, 35 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 933, 946 (2012). 
12. I leave for another day yet another potential source of bullshit in Indian 
law—the academy. See generally Robert Laurence, Indian-Law Scholarship and 
Tribal Survival: A Short Essay, Prompted by a Long Footnote, 27 AM. INDIAN L.
REV. 503 (2002-2003).  
13. I strongly recommend that every lawyer representing Indian tribes and 
tribal interests study the leading article in the area, Kristen A. Carpenter & Eli Wald, 
Lawyering for Groups: The Case of American Indian Tribal Attorneys, 81 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 3085 (2013). 
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While there is a lot of bullshit going around, I am mostly (but 
not entirely) concerned about bullshit from outside counsel, usually 
specialized counsel, directed at tribal clients. This paper is intended 
to identify a few areas where counsel employs bullshit when dealing 
with tribal clients. By counsel I mean both outside counsel and in-
house counsel, and by clients I include both in-house counsel and 
tribal leadership. The relationship between in-house counsel and 
nearly all tribal government clients renders tribal clients uniquely 
vulnerable to bullshit by outside counsel. I offer suggestions, mostly 
for the benefit of in-house counsel, on how to deal with bullshit from 
both outside counsel and tribal officials. However, I will be the first 
to acknowledge that in-house may be placed in a no-win scenario, 
especially once appellate specialists take control of a case involving 
tribal interests. 
I. THE TRIBAL CLIENT
The history of the relationship between Indian tribes and their 
attorneys is an amazing, fantastical history, riddled with federal 
intervention and meddling in tribal attorney contracts and drama.14
As Judge Canby noted in the first edition of his influential nutshell:
“The hiring of attorneys by the tribal council is generally authorized 
by tribal constitutions,” but is made subject to approve of the 
Secretary of Interior, as required by statute, 25 U.S.C. §§ 81-81a.15
“Th[is] requirement . . . became an obvious source of conflict . . . 
when tribes began to engage in litigation against federal authorities 
for breach of their trust responsibilities.”16 The Department of 
Interior could, by design or inadvertence, forestall hostile litigation 
simply by failing to approve the attorney’s contract.17 Felix S. Cohen, 
after reviewing public disclosures of Interior Department officials in 
the early 1950s, alleged that “the Indian Bureau has apparently been 
spying on the activities of tribal attorneys as they go through public 
files in the Interior Department Building and then advising opposing 
                                                     
14. See generally id. at 3097-109. 
15. WILLIAM C. CANBY, JR., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW IN A NUTSHELL 69-70 
(6th ed. 1981). 
16. Id. at 70.  
17. See id.; see also Carpenter & Wald, supra note 13, at 3100 (“In 1871, 
Congress not only ended treaty-making with tribes but also passed legislation 
requiring tribes to obtain federal approval before they could engage attorneys, even 
in suits against the United States. Ostensibly passed to protect tribal leaders from 
unscrupulous professionals, this statute often delayed, impeded, and compromised 
Indians’ access to legal services into the contemporary era.” (footnote omitted)).
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counsel concerning such activities in order that Indian claims may be 
more easily defeated.”18 On occasion, federal courts have ordered the 
Secretary of Interior to refrain from terminating the contract of tribal 
counsel.19
Congress reduced Interior’s authority over tribal attorney 
contracts in 1968,20 and then ended it in 2000.21 That history is well 
worth an article (or a book) by itself, but this paper is concerned only 
with the modern relationship between tribal governments, tribal 
officials, and their attorneys. This Part offers details on the 
relationship between elected tribal officials and in-house counsel. 
Not all tribes employ in-house counsel, but many do, and the 
trend is toward ever-larger tribal legal department staffing and 
budgets, often to the chagrin of tribal leaders and constituents who 
chafe at the expense. I have personal and professional experience 
with four Indian tribes, and will focus my initial comments on those 
four legal departments. Those tribes are the Grand Traverse Band of 
Ottawa and Chippewa Indians (GTB), the Suquamish Tribe, the 
Hoopa Valley Tribe, and the Pascua Yaqui Tribe. I particularly focus 
on GTB, my own tribe and the tribe for whom I worked the longest 
as in-house counsel.  
A. Tribal Leadership 
Tribal leadership usually consists of elected officials, typically 
referred to as tribal council members (or councilors) and tribal 
chairs. Some tribal leaders are unelected, but I have no experience 
with those tribes, so I will confine my analysis to elected tribal 
leaders. 
In each of the four tribes, tribal leadership consists of a tribal 
council and a tribal chair. The tribal council at GTB consists of six 
councilors elected to staggered, four-year terms in at-large elections 
held every other year, and a tribal chair elected separately, also for a 
four-year term.22 The chair presides at the meetings of the tribal 
council and has several other powers and duties—such as 
supervising tribal council committees—but generally the constitution 
                                                     
18. Felix S. Cohen, The Erosion of Indian Rights, 1950-1953: A Case Study 
in Bureaucracy, 62 YALE L.J. 348, 372 (1953). 
19. See, e.g., Udall v. Littell, 366 F.2d 668, 674-75 (D.C. Cir. 1966), cert. 
denied, 385 U.S. 1006 (1967). 
20. 25 U.S.C. § 1131 (2012). 
21. See 25 U.S.C. § 81(f)(1) (2012); 25 C.F.R. § 84.004(g) (2015). 
22. GRAND TRAVERSE BAND CONST. art. VII, § 1(c)-(d) (1988). 
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provides little independent authority to the chair.23 The tribal council 
is vested with most of the same powers that many other tribal council 
structures established by IRA-style constitutions employ24 and “shall 
act only by ordinance, motion, or resolution.”25 There is very little 
separation of powers between the executive and the legislature in the 
GTB constitution, unlike the clear separation of powers between the 
executive and legislative branches established in other Michigan 
tribal constitutions.26
The Hoopa Valley Tribe’s leadership also consists of a seven-
person tribal council, and a chairman.27 Like GTB, there is no real 
separation of powers provided for in the tribal constitution.28
However, there is a chairman’s ordinance that establishes the 
chairman’s authority as the tribe’s chief administrator.29 The 
ordinance requires the chairman to oversee tribal employees, among 
other things.30
The Suquamish Tribe’s governing body is the seven-member 
tribal council, which consists of a chair, vice-chair, secretary, 
treasurer, and three at-large council members.31 They are nominated 
and elected by the tribe’s general council.32 The Suquamish chair is 
authorized by the constitution to preside over tribal and general 
council meetings, sign checks, “and exercise any authority 
specifically delegated to him by the Tribal Council.”33 The tribal 
constitution empowers the Tribal Council, in exercising its regular 
powers and duties, to act in both the legislative and executive areas 
of government, with some powers delegated to the chair.34
The Pascua Yaqui Tribe’s elected leadership consists of eleven 
persons elected at-large every four years, all at once.35 The eleven 
officials then elect the chair and the vice-chair from within.36 The 
                                                     
23. Id. art. III, § 3(a). 
24. Id. art. IV, § 1. 
25. Id. art. III, § 5(e)(1). 
26. See, e.g., LITTLE RIVER BAND OF OTTAWA CONST. art. IV (legislative 
branch); id. art. V (executive branch); LITTLE TRAVERSE BAY BANDS OF ODAWA 
INDIANS CONST. art. VII (legislative branch); id. art. VIII (executive branch). 
27. CONST. AND BYLAWS OF THE HOOPA VALLEY TRIBE art. V, § 2. 
28. Id. art. V, § 2; id. art. IX, § 1; id. art. XI, § 1. 
29. Hoopa Valley Tribe, Ordinance 1-80 amend. 2 (Mar. 5, 1998). 
30. See id. at 2. 
31. CONST. AND BYLAWS OF THE SUQUAMISH TRIBE art. V, § 1. 
32. Id. art. V, § 2. 
33. Id. art. VI, § 1. 
34. Id. art. III. 
35. CONST. OF THE PASCUA YAQUI TRIBE art. V, § 2. 
36. Id. art. V, § 3. 
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council may also elect a secretary and a treasurer at its discretion.37
These executive officers form the executive branch, although they 
retain their positions as legislators on the tribal council.38 The 
constitution vests the chair with supervisory authority over the 
secretary and treasurer and all other tribal employees.39 The Yaqui 
tribal leadership displays some aspects of a separation of powers 
between the executive and legislative branches, but the executive 
officers serve in both capacities, rendering this structure a hybrid of 
sorts. 
These four tribal leadership structures are fairly typical for 
modern tribal governments. Most tribal governments that date back 
to the 1934 reorganization era do not employ completely separate 
legislative and executive branches, and often have significant 
commingling of powers.40 Others, such as the Muscogee (Creek) 
Nation, authorize each of the three branches of tribal government to 
retain separate counsel and establish an additional and separate 
attorney general or tribal attorney who represents the entire tribe.41
Occasionally, although I am not aware that this is standard practice, 
the tribal council may authorize the tribal in-house counsel to hire 
outside counsel and act in a largely independent manner from the 
tribal council.42
B. In-House Counsel 
As noted above, not all Indian tribes retain in-house counsel, 
but those that do are to be congratulated and commended for both 
                                                     
37. Id. art. VII, §§ 1, 3. 
38. Id. art. V, § 2; id. art. VII, § 1. 
39. Id. art. VII, § 1. 
40. Jason P. Hipp, Rethinking Rewriting: Tribal Constitutional Amendment 
and Reform, 4 COLUM. J. RACE & L. 73, 80 (2013). 
41. See Bryant v. Childers, 1 Okla. Trib. 316, 319-20 (Sup. Ct. of the 
Muscogee (Creek) Nation 1989) (“It is the opinion of the Supreme Court that all 
three branches of the Muscogee (Creek) Nation, Executive, National Council and 
Judicial, have the right to employ legal counsel to assist that branch in 
accomplishing their responsibilities under our Constitution, and that they must do so 
within the confines of the funds appropriated to the various branches of our 
government. The attorney for the Judicial Branch, Executive Branch or National 
Council is not the tribal attorney or attorney general, but merely represents the 
governmental branch employing the attorney. The tribal attorney or attorney general, 
however, represents the entire Muscogee (Creek) Nation and as such must have a 
contract approved by the National Council.”).
42. See Pearsall v. Tribal Council, 6 Am. Tribal Law 116, 118 
(Confederated Tribes of the Grand Ronde Community Tribal Court 2005). 
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enjoying sufficient resources to hire full-time counsel and for 
exercising their sovereignty in a manner that promotes strong self-
governance. That said, serving as in-house counsel is an incredibly 
demanding job riddled with ethical complications and professional 
responsibility traps.43 All attorneys know that a client is entitled to 
counsel of choice and that the client may terminate the attorney–
client relationship for any reason or no reason at all, in general. In-
house counsel confronted with conflicts of interest in tribal 
governance issues may have no legal leg to stand on. 
1. Tribal Political Pressures 
The first thing in-house counsel must be clear about is who or 
what is the client, and who or what speaks for the client. Consider 
the GTB leadership structure, where the tribal chair is not expressly 
authorized by the constitution to supervise employees or to direct 
counsel for the tribe; nor are the individual members of the tribal 
council.44 Under the plain language of the GTB constitution, only the 
tribal council may act, and the council may only act through 
resolution or ordinance.45 Certainly the tribal council could establish
a more efficient leadership structure by statute through delegating 
power by ordinance, resolution, or motion; but there is no established 
line of authority other than the constitution (except in the case of the 
tribe’s § 17 corporation, which is governed by the board established 
by its charter and retains its own in-house counsel46). The general 
counsel’s office—directed almost exclusively by GTB member John 
Petoskey since the 1980s—has, by virtue of practice and intense 
discipline, required the tribal leadership to act only in accordance 
with the terms of the constitution, and therefore requires valid tribal 
council instruction before taking action. There, the tribal client is the 
tribal council. 
My experience as in-house counsel at GTB was that individual
tribal councilors (and tribal government employees as well) 
attempted to direct legal department staff to take action with some 
regularity. Importantly, GTB tribal councilors were full-time 
employees of the tribe in their elected capacities, giving them the 
time and opportunity to interact with the legal department with a 
                                                     
43. See Claudeen Bates Arthur, The Role of the Tribal Attorney, 34 ARIZ.
ST. L.J. 21, 23-25 (2002); Carpenter & Wald, supra note 13, at 3109-13. 
44. See GRAND TRAVERSE BAND CONST. art. III, § 3; id. art. IV, § 1.  
45. See id. art. III, § 5(e).  
46. 15 Grand Traverse Band Code §§ 239, 247. 
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great deal of frequency.47 Because of the general counsel’s leadership 
and clarity about the attorney-client relationship, individual 
employees of the legal department (lawyers and non-lawyers both) 
knew to report these interactions with individual council members to 
the general counsel, who would then seek full-council authority and 
direction on the matter. This practice largely prevented individual 
councilors from interfering with legal department operations absent 
valid tribal council action. For junior attorneys and for staff, the 
general counsel’s presence served as important insulation from the 
daily politics of the tribal government.48
GTB’s legal department culture may have been an anomaly and 
does not completely control for the single biggest problem for in-
house counsel—their lack of insulation from the political activity of 
elected tribal leaders. Federal and state government attorneys, 
excepting political appointees, are usually insulated from the 
political activity of the elected leaders in those governments. Federal 
and state governments have far more lawyers and layers of 
bureaucratic distance between elected officials and political 
appointees than tribal governments do. While there are occasional 
breakdowns in that relationship—the firing of several Indian country 
United States Attorneys during the Bush Administration in 2006 may 
                                                     
47. During this same period, the tribal council and the tribal court, which is 
constitutionally independent from tribal council, engaged in a difficult dispute over 
the authority of the council over tribal court employees. Grand Traverse Band of 
Ottawa and Chippewa Indians Tribal Council v. Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa and 
Chippewa Indians Tribal Court Administrator, No. 02-09-1351-CV, 2003 WL 
25838644 (Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa and Chippewa Indians Tribal Court, 
May 22, 2003) (adopting Memorandum of Understanding regarding tribal court 
hiring practices). 
48. Of course, a few years after I left the GTB legal department, the tribal 
council terminated the general counsel after twenty-three years because of what 
appeared to be a worsening relationship between the legal department and the tribal 
council. See Matthew L.M. Fletcher, John Petoskey’s Legal Career (So Far.....) –
Updated, TURTLE TALK (Feb. 3, 2010), http://turtletalk.wordpress.com/2010/ 
02/03/john-petoskeys-legal-career-so-far/; Eric Carlson, Attorney Who Guided 
Tribal Growth Loses His Job, LEELANAU ENTERPRISE (Feb. 4, 2010), 
http://turtletalk.files.wordpress.com/2010/02/leelanau-enterprise-article-on-jp.pdf; 
Brian Upton, Letter to the Editor, Attorney Was Valued, TRAVERSE CITY RECORD-
EAGLE (Feb. 11, 2010), https://turtletalk.wordpress.com/2010/02/11/brain-upton-
letter-re-john-petoskey/. A few years after that, the tribal council re-hired the general 
counsel—only now he serves not as an employee, but as an independent contractor 
through his law firm. 
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be an example49—those breakdowns are relatively rare. Not so in 
Indian country, where there are almost no protections for in-house 
counsel from the political actors in tribal government. Imagine the 
conflict of interest endured by Keweenaw Bay Indian Community 
tribal in-house counsel Joseph O’Leary, who was charged with 
investigating possible kickbacks in a gaming scheme involving a 
tribal elected official.50 There, the tribal official attempted to argue in 
federal court later that O’Leary’s testimony in the criminal case was 
attorney-client privileged.51 Some enterprising tribal lawyers have 
negotiated for contractual protections in the event the tribal client 
terminates their employment, but even those protections are often 
illusory.52
At Pascua, I experienced a difficult scenario involving the 
relationship between the tribal client and the tribal attorney’s office.53
As noted above, there were four tribal executive officers who were 
also members of the tribal council at Pascua. Politics being politics, 
                                                     
49. See generally U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, AN INVESTIGATION INTO THE
REMOVAL OF NINE U.S. ATTORNEYS IN 2006 (Sept. 2008), 
https://oig.justice.gov/special/s0809a/final.pdf. 
50. See United States v. Dakota, 197 F.3d 821, 824-25 (6th Cir. 1999) 
(“Tribal attorney Joseph O’Leary testified to conversations with Dakota which took 
place in 1991. After O’Leary questioned Dakota about kickbacks, Dakota asked him 
whether it would be appropriate if Dakota were to obtain a share of the profits 
generated by installing certain video lottery devices on the reservation. O’Leary 
advised him twice that he would need to make a disclosure to the tribal council 
before they voted to install such devices.”).
51. See id. at 825 (“The only evidence Dakota submitted in support of his 
claim of privilege was the affidavit of O’Leary, which is insufficient to support the 
claim of attorney-client privilege. O’Leary was counsel for KBIC, and his affidavit 
does not establish that Dakota contacted O’Leary for legal advice as an individual as 
opposed to seeking advice from O’Leary in his position as tribal attorney. The 
district court correctly ruled that Dakota’s conversations with O’Leary were not 
protected by the attorney-client privilege.” (footnote omitted)).
52. The experience of former Little River Band attorney Joseph Martin, 
who apparently negotiated for contractual protections, may be an example of how 
the contractual protections did little to protect him. Little River Band of Ottawa 
Indians Tribal Council v. Little River Band of Ottawa Indians Tribal Ogema, 8 Am. 
Tribal Law 287 (Little River Band of Ottawa Indians Tribal Court 2009). The tribal 
and state court litigation, and the proceedings before the Illinois state bar 
disciplinary commission, that followed his termination is another story for another 
time. See generally Complaint, In the Matter of Martin, No. 2011PR00048 (Hearing 
Board of the Illinois Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission, May 20,
2011), https://turtletalk.files.wordpress.com/2011/06/ardc-complaint1.pdf. 
53. In recent years, the tribe reorganized the tribal attorney’s office into the 
Office of Attorney General. See 2 Pascua Yaqui Tribal Code §§ 2-1-10 to 2-1-80.
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several tribal members targeted the executive officers for recall.54 In 
normal, day-to-day operations, because of the chair’s duties as chief 
executive, the tribal attorney’s office took direction on legal matters 
from the chair. But since the chair faced the possibility of a recall 
election, the tribal attorney’s office faced a series of potential 
conflicts of interest. The tribal attorney represents the tribe, of 
course, and if a conflict between tribal entities arises (say, for 
example, the human resources department and the health clinic 
management), the chair—presumably in consultation with the tribal 
council as a whole—would make the call on which position the tribe 
would take. In this instance, however, the tribal entity seeking legal 
advice was the election board.55 Potentially, the election board could 
exercise its discretion to initiate a recall election involving the chair, 
forcing in-house counsel to face the possibility that the chair might 
order the tribal attorney to take action to stop the recall. President 
Nixon put the Department of Justice in this position during the 
Watergate era in the infamous Saturday Night Massacre.56
Luckily, the chair, Mr. Benito F. Valencia, was a man of 
impeccable integrity and ethics and probably would not have 
imposed his own self-interest on in-house counsel. In any event, the 
conflict did not arise as it could have, relieving the tribal attorney’s 
office from advising the tribal client against the personal interests of 
the chair. Even so, the tribal council, after the next regular election in 
which Chairman Valencia did not retain his chairmanship, 
terminated the contracts of the lead and deputy tribal attorneys about 
a year later. 
There are two ways out of a position as in-house counsel for an 
Indian tribe—resignation and termination. In the event the tribal 
client demands advice or legal action that conflicts with in-house 
counsel’s professional responsibilities (or individual ethics), the 
Saturday Night Massacre scenario may come to pass, forcing counsel 
to either resign or be terminated from employment. Similarly, in-
house counsel pushing back against the wishes of the tribal counsel 
on the grounds that the goals have little or no chance of success, or 
are simply bad public policy, face the same dilemma. As Carpenter 
and Wald put it: “[T]ribal clients are not insulated from the dominant 
                                                     
54. CONST. OF THE PASCUA YAQUI TRIBE art. X, § 1. 
55. See 2 Pascua Yaqui Tribal Code §§ 4-3-10 to 4-3-70. 
56. Carroll Kilpatrick, Nixon Forces Firing of Cox; Richardson, 
Ruckelshaus Quit: President Abolishes Prosecutor’s Office; FBI Seals Records,
WASH. POST, Oct. 21, 1973, at A01, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
srv/national/longterm/watergate/articles/102173-2.htm.  
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culture of aggressive individualism and narrow pursuit of self-
interest, let alone America’s love affair with litigation, such that a 
tribal attorney who does bring these issues to the attention of clients 
may be dismissed or ignored.”57 That Sword of Damocles hangs over 
many a tribal attorney due to pressure to conform to the demands of 
the tribal client.  
Individual tribal members may also attempt to influence or 
even issue direction to in-house tribal counsel. In my experience, 
tribal members are often under the misperception that they are the 
clients of the “tribal attorney” and may ask for representation.58 If the 
tribal client authorizes and directs in-house counsel to represent 
individual tribal members, then it may be permissible. Individual 
tribal members may also focus their ire on in-house counsel.59 As 
Ken Bellmard, veteran in-house counsel, wrote years ago:  
[A]s a tribal attorney half the tribe thinks you are a devil. This was true in 
regard to my employment with the Absentee-Shawnee Tribe. A tribal 
attorney is essentially a political appointee and when politics change you 
are likely to be an early casualty in any political fallout. You are also 
likely to become a pawn in any power struggle that may be unfolding 
between Tribal elected officials.60
In my own experience, a GTB council member demanded to 
know why the tribe should sign on to a tribal–state tax agreement I 
had helped negotiate on behalf of the tribe.61 The tax agreement 
included an “agreement area” that stood in the place of reservation 
boundaries for purposes of identifying lands, activities, and 
individuals eligible for the benefits of the tax agreement.62 The 
council member demanded to know why the legal department instead 
did not sue the State of Michigan for a decision that the tribe’s six-
                                                     
57. Carpenter & Wald, supra note 13, at 3137.  
58. See Dale T. White, Tribal Law Practice: From the Outside to the 
Inside, 10 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 505, 509 (2000) (“Because you are on-site, tribal 
members sometimes assume that you are available to work on their personal issues. 
As a matter of policy, the tribe should restrict this type of representation.”).
59. Cf. Diver v. Peterson, 524 N.W.2d 288, 292 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995) 
(dismissing defamation suit against tribal in-house counsel by tribal members who 
had been fired from tribal employment). 
60. Ken Bellmard, Endeavoring to Persevere: Becoming and Being a Tribal 
Attorney, 9 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 752, 757 (2000). 
61. See generally Matthew L.M. Fletcher, The Power to Tax, the Power to 
Destroy, and the Michigan Tribal-State Tax Agreements, 82 U. DET. MERCY L. REV.
1 (2004). 
62. See Tax Agreement Maps, GRAND TRAVERSE BAND OF OTTAWA &
CHIPPEWA INDIANS, http://www.gtbindians.org/taxmaps.asp (last visited Nov. 2, 
2015).  
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county service area constituted the tribe’s reservation, perhaps 
thinking that since the tribe had been part of successful treaty rights 
cases in years past that the tribe would be assured of victory now.63
The tribe’s treaty-established reservation boundaries, at their furthest 
extent, never extended to what is now the six-county service area.64
Had the tribe brought a suit to establish the six-county service area as 
the modern reservation, success would have been an uphill struggle. 
Had the GTB council member sought a second opinion from 
outside counsel, outside counsel might have provided a different 
opinion, one potentially tainted with bullshit.  
2. Outside Counsel 
In-house counsel also faces pressures and conflicts from 
another direction—specialized counsel, usually in the form of 
outside counsel. Not all tribal clients assign to in-house counsel the 
obligation to supervise outside counsel, but typically entities like 
tribal governments organized in a corporate form rely upon in-house 
counsel to at least nominally supervise outside counsel’s work. In my 
experience, the greater the experience of the in-house attorney, the 
more likely the tribal client is to require in-house counsel to 
supervise outside counsel. For example, as a new, inexperienced 
attorney with the Pascua Yaqui Tribe, I would have been at a loss to 
supervise outside attorneys with many more years experience as they 
prepared a fee-to-trust application for the tribe. Another example—
for a brief period of time, I served as the (acting) lead attorney for 
the Hoopa Valley Tribe after my supervisor suddenly resigned after a 
spat with the tribal chairman. Outside counsel had represented the 
tribe through decades of litigation in federal court over the tribe’s 
dispute with its neighbors as well as years of litigation over the water 
rights of the tribe.65 Had the tribal council asked for my advice on the 
                                                     
63. E.g., Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa & Chippewa Indians v. Director, 
Mich. Dept. of Nat. Res., 141 F.3d 635 (6th Cir. 1998), cert. denied sub nom. Twp. 
of Leland v. Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa & Chippewa Indians, 525 U.S. 1040 
(1998); cf. United States v. Michigan, 471 F. Supp. 192 (W.D. Mich. 1979). 
64. The 1836 and 1855 treaties established reservations in portions of 
Antrim, Leelanau, and Grand Traverse Counties, far smaller than the current six-
county service area negotiated between the tribe and the Interior Department. See 
generally MATTHEW L.M. FLETCHER, THE EAGLE RETURNS: THE LEGAL HISTORY OF 
THE GRAND TRAVERSE BAND OF OTTAWA AND CHIPPEWA INDIANS 2-55 (2012). 
65. E.g., Bugenig v. Hoopa Valley Tribe, 266 F.3d 1201 (9th Cir. 2001) (en 
banc), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 927 (2002); Karuk Tribe of Cal. v. Ammon, 209 F.3d 
1366 (Fed. Cir. 2000), cert. denied sub nom. Karuk Tribe of Cal. v. United States, 
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work of esteemed outside counsel, I would have had virtually no 
basis to render a judgment. Conversely, attorneys with twenty-plus 
years in-house like John Petoskey at GTB or Michelle Hansen at 
Suquamish had enormous experience and expertise supervising 
outside counsel, from litigation specialists to financing specialists to 
taxation specialists. 
Regardless, even experienced in-house attorneys face doubts 
about their ability to supervise the work of legal specialists. In-house 
attorneys, while likely to be specialists on Indian law, are generalists. 
One study of corporate counsel found that outside firms routinely 
recommend work that might constitute a waste of the client’s 
resources under the rubric of “business development” with the 
assumption that in-house counsel is sophisticated enough to check 
against wasted resources.66 It is easy enough for outside counsel, 
once retained by a tribal client, to continually make 
recommendations on how to improve tribal governance through the 
drafting of tribal codes and policies—most tribes usually need that 
work done, but that kind of work is not worth billing three or four 
hundred dollars an hour, or more. Setting aside for a moment the 
assumption that in-house tribal counsel is “sophisticated” enough to 
push back against outside counsel’s pressure to bill “business 
development” work, more important are the very real pressures on 
in-house counsel to accede to recommendations from outside 
counsel, as well as the time and resources in-house counsel needs to 
effectively push back. 
In-house counsel that chooses to comply with a tribal client’s 
demands that plainly violate the rules of professional responsibility is 
not my concern here; that is for the state disciplinary committees to 
consider.  
                                                                                                               
532 U.S. 941 (2001); Shermoen v. United States, 982 F.2d 1312 (9th Cir. 1992), 
cert. denied, 509 U.S. 903 (1993). 
66. See Lerman, supra note 1, at 725 (“Adams acknowledged that the 
practice was deceptive, but urged that it was ‘fair business development that 
everybody understands.’ He pointed out that most of his firm’s clients are 
corporations, and therefore the contact person is usually the client’s general counsel. 
He felt that in-house counsel are quite sophisticated and realize that firms are always 
trying to get more business. Therefore, although the intent of this practice is 
deceptive (in that the firm attempts to convince clients that certain work will benefit 
them, when in fact it may not), Adams argued that the practice is justifiable because 
letters of suggestion usually do not actually deceive clients.”).
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3. The Supreme Court Bar 
In the context of Supreme Court specialists, the incentives are 
slightly different and potentially much more complicated. It is well 
established that practice before the Supreme Court is highly 
specialized, and only a few attorneys can passably claim to be a 
member of the “Supreme Court bar,” those who have argued a large 
number of cases before the Court.67
The so-called “Supreme Court bar” often measures success 
simply by the number of oral arguments made by counsel. Supreme 
Court specialists benefit from serving as counsel of record and 
arguing a case in the Supreme Court more than general appellate 
specialists and other outside counsel who may argue a handful of 
Supreme Court cases in a career: 
The boundaries of the Supreme Court bar are thus well defined. Indeed, 
there is a small, stable, and elite community that handles Supreme Court 
litigation on a regular basis. Juxtaposed to this elite is a larger, more fluid 
group of lawyers who have only passing contact with the Court. These are 
the inner and outer circles. 
Importantly, sophisticated clients—the wealthy and powerful litigants—
recognize the importance of this stratification. They appreciate the skills 
that lawyers in the inner circle possess and use those skills to secure 
advantages in access to the Court’s agenda.68
Experience matters in the Supreme Court, perhaps 
disproportionately so:69 “[L]awyers ‘make a significant contribution 
to success in [Supreme Court] litigation.’ There is a correlation 
between written and oral experience before the Supreme Court and 
success there: attorneys who litigate before the Court more 
frequently than their adversaries ‘prevail substantially more often.’”70
                                                     
67. See generally Richard J. Lazarus, Advocacy Matters Before and Within 
the Supreme Court: Transforming the Court by Transforming the Bar, 96 GEO. L.J.
1487 (2008); Joan Biskupic, Janet Roberts & John Shiffman, At America’s Court of 
Last Resort, a Handful of Lawyers Now Dominates the Docket, REUTERS (Dec. 8, 
2014, 10:30 AM), http://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/scotus/.  
68. KEVIN T. MCGUIRE, THE SUPREME COURT BAR: LEGAL ELITES IN THE 
WASHINGTON COMMUNITY 201 (1993). 
69. See generally Kevin T. McGuire, Repeat Players in the Supreme Court: 
The Role of Experienced Lawyers in Litigation Success, 57 J. POL. 187 (1995). See 
also Biskupic, Roberts & Shiffman, supra note 67 (“[A]n elite cadre of lawyers has 
emerged as first among equals, giving their clients a disproportionate chance to 
influence the law of the land.”).
70. Christine M. Macey, Referral Is Not Required: How Inexperienced 
Supreme Court Advocates Can Fulfill Their Ethical Obligations, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL 
ETHICS 979, 982 (2009) (footnote omitted). 
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The Justices recognize names as well. Then D.C. Circuit Judge John 
G. Roberts noted the dramatic rise in repeat players—those attorneys 
who had argued more than one case before the Supreme Court—in 
Supreme Court litigation since 1980: 
[There has been a] dramatic rise in the number of experienced Supreme 
Court advocates appearing before the Court, both in absolute terms and 
proportionately. That, in any event, was my impression, and I decided to 
test it by comparing the lawyers who argued in the 1980 Term and those 
who argued in the 2002 Term. In 1980, looking at oral arguments by non-
federal government attorneys—that is, basically excluding the Solicitor 
General’s Office—fewer than 20 percent of the advocates had ever 
appeared before the Supreme Court before. In 2002, that number had more 
than doubled, to over 44 percent. 
The change is even more dramatic if you look at what I will call 
experienced advocates, or recidivists—those with at least three previous 
arguments before the Court. In 1980, only 10 percent of non-Solicitor 
General arguments were presented by experienced counsel. In 2002, that 
number had more than tripled, to 33 percent. In 1980, only three lawyers 
outside the Solicitor General’s Office argued twice before the Court, out 
of some 240 argument slots for non-Solicitor General lawyers, accounting 
for 2.5 percent of the arguments. (For two of those three, it was their first 
and second arguments ever.) But in 2002, there were fourteen different 
non-Solicitor General repeat performers who argued at least twice—many 
more than twice—accounting for fully 24 percent of the non-Solicitor 
General argument slots, a tenfold increase.71
Veteran Supreme Court advocates might be willing to handle 
an appeal—even a doomed matter—for free because the advocate 
benefits in increased experience and cache for each case the advocate 
argues, even cases the client is almost certain to lose.72 That the 
Supreme Court bar has the reputation of battering in-house counsel 
and other Supreme Court neophytes with offers to draft briefs and 
serve as counsel when the Court has granted certiorari73 reinforces 
                                                     
71. John G. Roberts, Jr., Oral Advocacy and the Re-emergence of a 
Supreme Court Bar, 30 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 68, 75-76 (2005). 
72. Macey, supra note 70, at 988 (“Because the Court hears relatively few 
cases in a term, elite Supreme Court advocates take on pro bono cases at little or no 
charge to bolster prestige and keep their Supreme Court practices large enough to 
impress paying clients.”).
73. Id. at 990 (“There are ‘many attorneys who not infrequently barrage 
lower court counsel, or the client directly, with offers to assist with a case at the 
Court.’ In fact, first-time Supreme Court advocate Rod Sullivan learned that cert had 
been granted in his client’s case when he received calls from lawyers offering to 
write the brief at no cost. Once cert has been granted, ‘litigants receive volumes of
unsolicited information and numerous opinions regarding the abilities of their 
attorneys and the pros and cons of hiring a specialist.’” (footnotes omitted)).
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the notion that experienced Supreme Court advocates are aggressive 
in advancing cases through the Supreme Court pipeline once the case 
reaches that point. Supreme Court advocates might be in the unique 
position of advising a tribal client (in line with or against in-house 
counsel’s advice) to proceed with a strategy that benefits no one 
except the attorney.74
Moreover, political science studies support my view that a 
member of the Supreme Court bar may be incentivized to value 
candor to the Supreme Court over zealous advocacy. McGuire 
argues that members of the Supreme Court bar are, by definition, 
repeat players; their experience is valuable in terms of outcomes; and 
the Court values their experience because these lawyers are expected 
to provide the Court with the best information about a case: 
Because of their long-term links, lawyers whose Supreme Court practices 
transcend the single case have considerable incentive to provide candor in 
both their briefs and oral arguments. This is certainly not to suggest that 
the Court, of necessity, resolves cases in favor of the more experienced 
(and presumably more trustworthy) counsel; if that were so, the solicitor 
general would never lose a case on the merits. What this approach does 
assume, consistent with our notions of the benefits associated with repeat 
player status, is that the greater the degree of previous experience a lawyer 
has in litigating before the justices, the greater his or her credibility and 
likelihood of success.75
To be frank, a member of the Supreme Court bar wins even if the 
client loses. Even more, a member of the Supreme Court bar may 
feel incentivized to concede highly divisive positions at oral 
argument in order to preserve the lawyer’s credibility before the 
Court in future cases, likely cutting against the attorney’s obligation 
to be a zealous advocate for the tribal client.76 Tribal interests are 
                                                     
74. Cf. Stephen Ellmann, Lawyers and Clients, 34 UCLA L. REV. 717, 720 
(1987) (“Grasping neither the true nature of their clients’ problems, nor the contours 
of the solutions that would best meet their clients’ wishes, lawyers may wield a 
power that benefits no one so much as themselves.”).
75. McGuire, supra note 69, at 189. 
76. This is a question for a different paper, but my reading of the oral 
arguments in Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 134 S. Ct. 2024 (2014), and 
United States v. Navajo Nation, 556 U.S. 287 (2009), by counsel for the tribes 
possibly fits this bill. In Bay Mills, counsel first conceded that the State of Michigan 
could utilize its law enforcement authority to arrest tribal officials, tribal employees, 
and casino patrons on tribally owned lands. Transcript of Oral Argument at 32-33, 
Bay Mills, 134 S. Ct. 2024 (No. 12-515). Second, counsel conceded that his client’s 
position on immunity would allow any tribe to open and operate a casino anywhere 
in the United States. Id. at 44. The first concession, consistent with a strategy 
designed to win the case through preserving immunity at all costs, was the 
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among the least favored constituents of the Supreme Court, and 
members of the Supreme Court bar have less to lose when 
representing tribal interests and less to gain when tribal interests win. 
Of course, this theory might be entirely incorrect and 
inapplicable to the best Supreme Court advocates. But the incentives 
to underplay tribal clients appear to be real, and in-house counsel 
should be aware of them. And so should tribal clients.  
4. “Zealous Advocacy” and In-House Counsel 
At Federal Indian Bar 2013, I argued that the greatest bulwark 
against the threat the Supreme Court poses to tribal interests is in-
house counsel, with an assist from tribal court judges. My view 
places in-house counsel at the forefront of Indian country disputes. 
In-house counsel is part of the decision-making team at numerous 
critical decision points—when a dispute arises; the strategy for 
resolving the dispute; the strategy for approaching a dispute in 
litigation; and finally, how and whether a dispute should be 
adjudicated in the appellate courts and in the United States Supreme 
Court. 
Consider a dispute between a local township and a tribe over 
the township’s assessment of a personal property tax on the tribe’s 
copy machine vendor, which the vendor passes on to the tribe. The
tribe leases a copy machine from a national company, say Xerox. 
                                                                                                               
acceptance of a position that—I believe it is fair to say—no Indian tribe would 
accept if given the chance to deliberate. The second concession was perhaps simply 
a strategic blunder, especially as it came as an answer to Justice Alito’s question that 
apparently sought to flesh out a limiting principle to tribal immunity in similar cases. 
By “strategic blunder,” I mean the concession might influence Justices to rule 
against the tribe on the merits; but had counsel attempted to take an alternative 
position with the Court on that point, counsel’s credibility to the Court takes a 
tumble. Counsel might lose the Bay Mills case by answering so forthrightly but 
gains credibility before the Court. Similarly, counsel for the Navajo Nation in 2009 
made several jokes, including one about needing a haircut to explain why he used a 
barber shop hypothetical, Transcript of Oral Argument at 28, Navajo Nation, 556 
U.S. 287 (No. 07-1410) (no one laughed), repeated jokes about the testimony of 
former Interior Secretary Udall, id. at 40-41, 46 (which did elicit laughter), and one 
joke that appeared to be about the unusual character of this case—that the Navajos 
lost before the Court previously, and came up with a new theory for a second shot at 
the prize, id. at 40 (more laughter). Openly joking about the weaknesses in a client’s 
position preserves and perhaps privileges the advocate’s place in the Supreme Court 
bar while distinguishing himself from the tribal client. A few years later, the same 
advocate prevailed on behalf of a related client in Salazar v. Ramah Navajo 
Chapter, 132 S. Ct. 2181, 2185, 2195 (2012), so perhaps the strategy can pay off for 
repeat tribal players in Supreme Court litigation. 
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The township taxes the company in accordance with state law that 
grants it the authority. But the tribe only uses the copier for 
governmental purposes, say for the exclusive use of the tribe’s legal 
department. Each year the tribe pays hundreds of dollars (and more 
in some instances) to the township, in effect, for the right to use a 
copier for its legal work. Sovereignty warriors should be outraged. 
Sue the township in federal court, and then let the federal appellate 
court sort it out a few years down the road? Assuming the tribe wins 
there, the township—now bolstered by the Attorney General of the 
State—petitions for a writ of certiorari. Indian country observers 
know where this is going.77 Indian country tax protesters fare no 
better in the Supreme Court than other tax protesters. Was it worth 
it? Probably not. Maybe the better play is to negotiate. At GTB, the 
tribal government might be able to persuade the local government 
not to tax the vendor because the tribe shares gaming revenue with 
local units of government. 
Tribal in-house counsel may disagree with my assessment. 
Many attorneys representing Indian tribes from within may not be 
well situated to reach conclusions about how a small dispute—such 
as between a county official and a tribal member—can grow into a 
Supreme Court matter.78 Many in-house tribal attorneys may not 
view it as their obligation to attempt such considerations or will be 
unwilling to second-guess the tribal council except where the tribal 
council seeks to engage in flatly illegal action. 
Zealous advocacy from sovereignty warriors spearheaded by 
tribal client-centered representation is certainly reasonable and well 
within the rules.79 But in too many cases, zealous advocacy renders a 
disservice to Indian country. As Carpenter and Wald point out in the 
context of state and federal prosecutors, zealous advocacy and 
government advocacy is a poor fit—a government lawyer’s 
overriding goal is to seek justice first.80 To be sure, “justice” is not 
                                                     
77. Cf. Wagnon v. Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation, 546 U.S. 95, 115 
(2005). 
78. E.g., Bryan v. Itasca Cty., 426 U.S. 373, 375 (1976); see also Kevin K. 
Washburn, The Legacy of Bryan v. Itasca County: How an Erroneous $147 County 
Tax Notice Helped Bring Tribes $200 Billion in Indian Gaming Revenue, 92 MINN.
L. REV. 919 (2008). 
79. See generally Katherine R. Kruse, Fortress in the Sand: The Plural 
Values of Client-Centered Representation, 12 CLINICAL L. REV. 369 (2006). 
80. See Carpenter & Wald, supra note 13, at 3146. Former Solicitor 
General Seth Waxman, following a long line of SGs, made this explicit in 1998. 
Seth P. Waxman, Solicitor Gen. of the U.S., Address to the Supreme Court 
Historical Society: Presenting the Case of the United States as It Should Be: The 
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really what prosecutors are after, and in-house counsel rarely serves 
as tribal prosecutors, but I am in broad agreement with Carpenter and 
Wald that “effective representation might require, at times, not 
narrow zealous advocacy but tentative and mindful facilitation.”81
They point to the efforts of the Onondaga Nation and its counsel as 
an example of how zealous advocacy can be tempered with 
facilitation: 
[O]ne might reimagine the conversation between a tribal nation and its 
lawyers. Rather than merely advising the client about the Supreme Court’s
view of Indian rights (and the likelihood of losing most cases), the lawyer 
might listen carefully to the tribal leaders’ description of the interests and 
goals associated with rights claims, and then advise the client accordingly. 
As one example, the Onondaga Nation of New York is working with its 
lawyers to resolve historic land claims, but rather than focus purely on 
tribal rights, it has identified objectives including the clean-up of local 
natural resources and restoration of relationships with non-Indian 
neighbors. At the insistence of tribal leaders, the Onondaga land-claim 
complaint drafted by attorneys Joe Heath and Curtis Berkey calls for 
“healing of the land and water . . . with all people who live within the 
Onondaga original territory.” While still pursuing litigation, the Onondaga 
Nation’s lawyers are working on a strategy that includes community 
meetings, relationship building, and a discussion of shared interests.82
I have argued, and will continue to argue, that litigation is a 
critical element to improving Indian country governance by the three 
sovereigns.83 But the adversarial process is a poor process with which 
to improve governance—the winner-take-all scenario guarantees 
losers, and that result is simply unacceptable in good governance. 
However, this paper is not about how in-house counsel and the 
tribal client can come together to engage in nation building through 
mutual respect, cooperation, and facilitation. This paper is about 
bullshit, and the threat bullshit poses to nation building. 
                                                                                                               
Solicitor General in Historical Context (June 1, 1998) (“The Solicitor General is not 
a neutral, he is an advocate; but an advocate for a client whose business is not 
merely to prevail in the instant case. My client’s chief business is not to achieve 
victory, but to establish justice.” (quoting Simon E. Sobeloff, Attorney for the 
Government: The Work of the Solicitor General’s Office, 41 A.B.A. J. 229, 229 
(1955))). 
81. Carpenter & Wald, supra note 13, at 3147. 
82. Id. at 3147 (footnotes omitted). 
83. See Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Kathryn E. Fort & Nicholas J. Reo, Tribal 
Disruption and Indian Claims, 112 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 65 (2014), 
http://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr_fi/vol112/iss1/8.  
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II. BULLSHIT
This Part details how the vulnerability of in-house counsel to 
tribal politics, coupled with their potential inability to adequately 
supervise outside counsel, can create conditions that severely 
compromises counsel’s ability to deal with bullshit.  
A. The Goals of the Tribal Client 
Most modern American Indian tribal leadership structures have 
changed dramatically from traditional or customary leadership 
systems. Modern tribal leaders generally are elected in tribal 
elections, a much different process for leadership selection than the 
processes used by traditional tribal communities. For example, the 
nineteenth century Odawa and Ojibwe leaders who spoke for the 
various tribal bands—the ogimaag or ogemuk—during treaty 
negotiations were not selected because they won a majority vote of 
the adult members of their communities; the communities selected 
them (one hopes) because they appeared to possess the relevant skill 
set needed to negotiate an acceptable treaty.84 During treaty times, 
the Anishinaabeg did not vest leadership in individuals in the same 
way as a modern elected leader, who is legally entitled to sit for an 
entire term of years; instead, treaty-era Anishinaabe communities 
could (and did) strip ogimaag of leadership summarily and, in the 
case of a Grand River Odawa ogema, possibly murder a leader for 
decisions not supported by the community.85 The ogema might have 
lied, bluffed, or bullshitted his or her way into a leadership position, 
but once the tribal community realized it, the community could 
easily call out the ogema and terminate the leadership.86
Some modern Indian tribes are at least partially governed by 
the collected body of tribal members, usually called a general 
council. For example, the Suquamish Tribe—meeting as a collected 
body of the membership—voted in favor of marriage equality, a vote 
that influenced the elected tribal council to enact a marriage equality 
statute.87 Another example is the initial approval by the Bay Mills 
Indian Community leadership of the 1985 consent decree that 
                                                     
84. See FLETCHER, supra note 64, 13-17 (2012). 
85. See id. at 16. 
86. E.g., ANTON TREUER, THE ASSASSINATION OF HOLE IN THE DAY (2011). 
87. Steven Gardner, Suquamish Tribe Approves Same-Sex Marriage,
KITSAP SUN (Aug. 1, 2011, 7:13 PM), http://www.kitsapsun.com/news/2011/aug/01/ 
suquamish-tribe-approves-same-sex-marriage/#axzz2qfQaE1WI. 
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concluded the gillnetting portion of the United States v. Michigan
litigation, only to be reversed by the general council.88 In some ways, 
a general council replicates traditional tribal governance, which one 
could characterize in modern parlance as popular democracy, but 
modern general councils rarely replace or supplant the decisions and 
positions of elected tribal leaders. 
Importantly, the modern elected leaders serve as the face of the 
modern tribe and are empowered to announce and implement the 
position of the tribe in court and elsewhere. Whatever the structure 
and duties of the tribal leadership, it is the leadership that represents 
the tribe in court, at the negotiating table and elsewhere—the leaders 
are the tribal client for the purpose of the attorney–client 
relationship.  
Elected tribal government leaders are politicians and primed to 
espouse bullshit. Moreover, if elected tribal leadership agrees on a 
bullshit legal or political position and the leadership speaks for the 
tribe, then the tribe is espousing bullshit. Consider the purchase of 
land in Vanderbilt, Michigan by the Bay Mills Indian Community in 
2010. Local news reports stated that there were rumors the tribe had 
plans to open a casino there, but tribal leaders denied the rumors and 
even stated the land would be used for treaty hunting purposes:  
While rumors have circulated that the tribe may choose to open a casino 
on the land, leaders of Bay Mills said they will use the land for hunting 
purposes. 
Tribal leaders said they have been looking for a parcel of land for more 
than 10 years and the current economic climate allowed the tribe to buy 
the property at a reasonable price. Leaders have not prepared any trust 
application in regards to the site. 
“It’s no secret we have wanted to be a part of the community for a long 
time,” said BMIC Tribal Chairman Jeff Parker. “We have nothing to hide, 
our trucks are parked right outside the building. We own it and are 
currently working to make the structure functional.”
The tribe has been hunting elk in the region since 2007. The tribe is also 
in talks with private landowners to buy large tracts of land for hunting 
purposes.89
But just a few days later, the tribe opened the doors on a casino 
on the Vanderbilt parcel.90 Were the references to elk hunting 
                                                     
88. See United States v. Michigan, 12 Indian L. Rep. 3079, 3079 (W.D. 
Mich. 1985). 
89. Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Bay Mills Buys Land in Vanderbilt, TURTLE
TALK (Oct. 26, 2010), http://turtletalk.wordpress.com/2010/10/26/bay-mills-buys-
land-in-vanderbilt/. 
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bullshit? Well, perhaps not, in that maybe the Bay Mills leadership 
initially intended to use the land for the exclusive purpose of 
facilitating elk hunting. In the press release, the tribe again mentions 
elk hunting but now in the context of the tribe’s connection to the 
area: “Tribal members are familiar with the Vanderbilt area as they 
have been hunting elk in the region since 2007, exercising off-
reservation treaty rights established with the 2007 Inland Consent 
Decree.”91 Now elk hunting is in the mix, but seemingly in a different 
manner than originally implied. Taking these two statements 
together, one can reach a conclusion that they are bullshit, or perhaps 
evasion—a nuanced form of bullshit.92
Concluding that the statements of Bay Mills leaders were 
bullshit is irrelevant to the thesis of this paper. What is relevant is 
that the statements of the tribal leaders could be and appear to be 
bullshit, and these statements are examples of how tribal leaders 
might bullshit and how a tribal legal or political position itself, 
therefore, can be bullshit. 
Tribes like the Bay Mills Indian Community are located far 
from a large metropolitan area that can serve as a profitable if not 
lucrative gaming market. In my view, it is perfectly justifiable for 
Indian tribes to seek the best gaming market possible—federal law 
arguably encourages tribes and states as their business partners to 
utilize their sovereignty for this purpose93—but to do so at the 
expense of other tribes is less justifiable.94 A few weeks after opening 
the casino in Vanderbilt, the tribe acknowledged that it planned to 
open a much larger casino in Port Huron, Michigan if the legal 
                                                                                                               
90. Press Release, Shannon Jones, Bay Mills Indian Cmty. (Nov. 3, 2010), 
http://turtletalk.files.wordpress.com/2010/11/bmic-casino-press-release.pdf.  
91. Id.
92. See Thomas L. Carson, Lying, Deception, and Related Concepts, in THE
PHILOSOPHY OF DECEPTION 153, 186 (Clancy Martin ed., 2009). 
93. See Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Bringing Balance to Indian Gaming, 44 
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 39, 40 (2007); see also id. at 63 (describing the Seneca Nation 
and the State of New York’s collective and cooperative efforts to expand off-
reservation gaming opportunities). 
94. The Little Traverse Bay Bands of Odawa Indians alleged that the Bay 
Mills tribe’s casino directly siphoned off profits from the Little Traverse casino. See
Brief in Support of Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 3, Little Traverse Bay 
Bands of Odawa Indians v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty. (W.D. Mich.) (No. 1:10-cv-
01278-PLM), http://turtletalk.files.wordpress.com/2010/12/2010-12-21-brief-in-
support-of-preliminary-injunction.pdf. That case was later consolidated with 
Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., No. 1:10-cv-01273-PLM (W.D. Mich.) (issuing 
injunction against Bay Mills), rev’d, 695 F.3d 406 (6th Cir. 2012), aff’d, 134 S. Ct. 
2024 (2014). 
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theory behind the Vanderbilt casino survived challenges from the 
State of Michigan and the Little Traverse Bay Bands of Odawa 
Indians.95 As the editorial board of the Port Huron paper noted, the 
tribe had “little to lose and much to gain” by opening a casino.96
Importantly, the legal theories supporting the opening of the casino 
are not bullshit, but the statements made in the press by tribal leaders 
could be interpreted and identified as bullshit. 
Organizational clients can place in-house counsel in very 
difficult positions. Lawyers anywhere can relate to a client who 
seeks a certain outcome—tax exemptions, regulatory relief, purchase 
of an asset for less than half the market value, to name just a few 
examples—and to find a way legally, any way at all. Lawyers with 
clients like these may be forced to consider how far they can go 
before they run up against the limitations of the code of professional 
responsibility. 
Tribal in-house counsel’s vulnerability to unreasonable, 
irresponsible, and even alarming demands from the tribal client is 
exacerbated by the fact that it often takes a special kind of person to 
seek an in-house counsel position for an Indian tribe. Many attorneys 
seeking in-house counsel positions may be, in the words of more 
than one former tribal chair, “sovereignty warriors.”97 Sovereignty 
warriors are dedicated to the cause of justice for Indian tribes and 
individual Indians.98 They are knowledgeable about the history of 
federal and state government actions—usually engineered by other 
lawyers—that dispossessed Indians and tribes of their culture, 
language, lands, and resources.99 They may also be knowledgeable of 
incidents in the modern era where tribal counsel exploited tribal 
clients.100 Tribal leaders that promise dramatic advances in tribal 
                                                     
95. Matthew L.M. Fletcher, 1500-Slot Casino Planned for Port Huron if 
BMIC Vanderbilt Casino Succeeds, TURTLE TALK (Nov. 28, 2010), http://turtletalk. 
wordpress.com/2010/11/28/1500-slot-casino-planned-for-port-huron-if-bmic-
vanderbilt-casino-succeeds/. 
96. Id.
97. I borrow from Rob Porter. See Robert B. Porter, Tribal Lawyers as 
Sovereignty Warriors, 6 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y, no. 4, 1997, at 7. 
98. Id. at 9-10.  
99. Id. at 9-11.  
100. E.g., Ho-Chunk Mgmt. Corp. v. Fritz, 618 F. Supp. 616, 618 (W.D. 
Wis. 1985) (“There is nothing in the record to suggest that on or before July 9, 1983 
Mr. Koberstein disclosed that there was even a potential conflict of interest between 
his duties as Tribal attorney and his position as president and sole stockholder of 
Ho-Chunk Management. By his failure to disclose the conflict prior to execution of 
the Agreement by the WWBC, Koberstein took unfair advantage of the Tribe at a 
time when it was most susceptible to his influence. It is this fundamental unfairness 
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fortunes might or might not be bullshitting in order to get elected, but 
sovereignty warriors are for real. And in my experience, sovereignty 
warriors do not want to be the ones to advise tribal clients that a goal 
is unattainable or extremely costly to attain. 
In sum, the tribal client, embodied by elected tribal leaders who 
quite possibly employ large pots of bullshit to secure election, may 
very well lead an Indian tribe down a very treacherous political and 
legal road. In-house counsel, in the event the tribal electorate does 
not act to curb tribal leaders, can find himself or herself in the 
unenviable position of standing as the last barrier to a tribal client 
proceeding on a legally indefensible position. In these circumstances, 
should they ever arise, outside counsel can be the best friend or the 
worst enemy of in-house counsel. 
B. The Goals of Outside Counsel 
Outside counsel that represents or seeks to represent tribal 
clients are typically, but not always, structured as for-profit law 
firms. There may be the occasional nonprofit entity like the Native 
American Rights Fund or perhaps lawyers doing pro bono work, but 
in the large majority of instances, outside counsel is profit-seeking. 
There may be the occasional firm that dedicates its mission to 
representing tribal clients and to related social justice measures, but a 
for-profit firm remains a profit-seeking firm. And there can be no 
profits without clients, putting enormous pressure on law firm 
attorneys to impress potential clients and exact maximum revenue 
from the client.101
As noted earlier, the tribal client may expressly direct in-house 
counsel to supervise the work of outside counsel. The tribal client 
might also expressly seek advice from outside counsel as a 
countermeasure to advice by in-house counsel the tribal client does 
not find satisfactory. 
Despite the decent likelihood that in-house counsel serves as 
the ostensible supervisor of outside counsel, outside counsel enjoys a 
series of enormous advantages over in-house counsel. First, outside 
counsel is usually specialized counsel. For example, outside counsel 
may have twenty-five years experience litigating and negotiating 
                                                                                                               
which the Tribe later recognized and acted to eliminate.” (quoting Letter from Earl 
Barlow, Minn. Area Dir. for the Bureau of Indian Affairs (May 18, 1984))). 
101. See Lerman, supra note 1, at 662 (“Impressing prospective clients is a 
prerequisite to successful private law practice. In most types of practice, lawyers 
face considerable pressure to bring in new clients.”). 
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Indian taxation issues with the Internal Revenue Service. Second, 
outside counsel usually will have significantly larger resources to 
access than in-house counsel. Outside counsel may be part of a large, 
full service law firm that can handle every potential angle to a 
dispute with an experienced specialist, perhaps ranging from 
intellectual property to federal appellate litigation to governmental 
ethics to any number of other specialties. Third, outside counsel has 
access to a greater and more relevant network of connections, 
arguably useful in lobbying a tribe’s position to federal and state 
political and administrative entities. There are other advantages in 
this vein as well, ranging from superficial assets like degrees from 
elite law schools and better suits to disturbing assets like race or 
gender.102 Fourth, neither the tribal client nor in-house counsel might 
have the relevant information needed to assess whether outside 
counsel’s advice is “irresponsible.”103
However, the biggest advantage of all is the unique 
vulnerability of in-house counsel to the tribal client. Couple that 
advantage with the possibility that outside counsel will employ 
bullshit and confirm that the tribal client’s goals are attainable, 
whether or not the goals are reasonable, in-house counsel may be put 
in an impossible situation.104  
The biggest area of in-house counsel vulnerability to outside 
counsel may be in the area of Supreme Court practice. Perhaps 
nowhere else is experience in that specific court more valuable and 
palpably critical to success.  
C. The Stakes 
Tribal litigation involves high stakes. Occasionally, the legal, 
political, and cultural viability of the tribal interest is at stake. 
Carpenter and Wald point out that tribal litigation has been wrought 
with risk, beginning with the origins of Indian law: 
                                                     
102. Yes, in my experience, the tribal client may doubt the advice of an in-
house counselor who is a person of color or a woman and seek a second opinion 
from a lawyer that is not a member of a racial, gender, or sexual minority. 
103. Lerman, supra note 1, at 682-83 (“Clients who do not have accurate 
information about their lawyers’ qualifications or about what the lawyers have or 
have not done on their behalf are in a poor position to evaluate the services that they 
are getting or to get better services if their lawyers are incompetent or irresponsible. 
This lack of information is one reason why market forces are so ineffective in 
helping to maintain high standards in law practice.” (footnote omitted)).
104. The sovereignty warriors may be as susceptible to outside counsel’s 
bullshit as the tribal client, but we will leave aside for now. 
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As the Cherokee cases begin to suggest, the relationship between Indian 
tribes and their lawyers has long implicated issues of the greatest 
magnitude. By most accounts, the Cherokees had an excellent lawyer in 
these cases. Additionally, as described in greater detail below, the 
Cherokee leaders went into the litigation with their eyes wide open about 
the strategy, believing that an appeal to the courts was the best remaining 
chance of preserving the Cherokee Nation, particularly after having 
already petitioned the executive and legislative branches for relief.105
As is well known, the Cherokee Nation largely prevailed in the 
Worcester v. Georgia,106 only to be subjected to the genocide of the 
Trail of Tears, “a devastating experience during which 4,000 people, 
or approximately one-quarter of the population, died.”107
Modern tribal interests face a terribly difficult path in litigating 
their rights in federal and state courts. The United States Constitution 
contains no express provisions protecting or outlining tribal 
sovereignty. As a result, tribes face difficult hurdles in litigating 
against federal and state governments over governance issues such as 
taxation, criminal jurisdiction, environmental regulation, and historic 
claims. As Carpenter and Wald (channeling Jim Anaya) point out, 
the law is designed to work against tribal interests as a structural 
matter: 
As S. James Anaya wrote with respect to his work in Nevada v. Hicks,
tribal lawyers face a number of challenging conflicts questions in tribal 
representation. As Anaya put it, “[H]ow do we advise our Indian or tribal 
clients when we see Federal Indian Law, which was once understood to be 
a friendly body of doctrine, being emasculated by the federal courts to the 
detriment of tribal interests?”108
Moreover, tribal lawsuits—especially those that reach the 
Supreme Court—tend to result in rules with a broad reach. In fact, 
settling a question that has and may recur in similar circumstances is 
one of the roles of the Supreme Court. In Indian law, the broad reach 
of these rules may extend to every one of the federally recognized 
tribes.109 Carpenter and Wald point out that Indian law’s “cause 
lawyers”—for example, the litigators and their advisors that 
                                                     
105. Carpenter & Wald, supra note 13, at 3098 (footnote omitted). 
106. 31 U.S. 515 (1832). 
107. Carpenter & Wald, supra note 13, at 3098. 
108. Id. at 3136 (footnote omitted) (quoting S. James Anaya, The Ethical 
Dilemma of Doing Federal Indian Law, Paper Delivered to the Federal Bar 
Association’s Annual Indian Law Conference (Apr. 4-5, 2002)). 
109. Cf. Robert N. Clinton, Reservation Specificity and Indian Adjudication: 
An Essay on the Importance of Limited Contextualism in Indian Law, 8 HAMLINE L. 
REV. 543 (1985); Ezra Rosser, Ambiguity and the Academic: The Dangerous 
Attraction of Pan-Indian Legal Analysis, 119 HARV. L. REV. F. 141 (2006). 
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participate in the Tribal Supreme Court Project—assert a duty to 
“similarly situated . . . nonpart[ies].”110
D. Off-Reservation Casino Scenarios 
Consider the scenario of the off-reservation casino. Tribe A, 
imagine the Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians, is 
considering opening a casino in Lansing, Michigan.111 Tribe A’s best 
legal argument is that it is the beneficiary of a federal statute, 
sometimes called a mandatory trust acquisition statute.112 In such a 
case, Congress provides that the Department of Interior “shall” 
acquire land in trust for the benefit of the beneficiary tribe, such as 
Tribe A.113 Even with that statute, Tribe A faces significant hurdles in 
its quest to open an off-reservation casino in Lansing. Outside 
counsel provides a legal opinion that reasonably concludes there is a 
good chance, say fifty-fifty, that Tribe A will prevail. Outside 
counsel is very, very expensive and makes clear from the outset that 
this initiative will be very costly. In-house counsel for Tribe A, 
perhaps, should be grateful. Outside counsel does not appear to have 
bullshitted the tribal client by claiming, for example, that Tribe A is 
almost destined to prevail and that the legal theory is bulletproof. 
Tribe A proceeds with its claims, fully advised of their chances for 
success and failure, and the costs associated with both. 
In contrast, consider Tribe B’s situation, which is more 
complicated. Tribe B, modeled on the Bay Mills Indian Community, 
also wants to open a casino downstate, say in Port Huron, 
Michigan.114 Tribe B, however, is not the beneficiary of a mandatory 
trust acquisition statute as clear-cut as the one Congress enacted for 
Tribe A, but the legal theory the tribe employs relating to the status 
                                                     
110. Carpenter & Wald, supra note 13, at 3140 (“Other lawyers sometimes 
struggle with questions about the impact of dispute resolution and precedent on 
nonparty group members who may be similarly situated. Cause lawyers, for 
example, often worry about strategic selection of cases for litigation and about the 
filing of a case by an individual that may be inconsistent with the cause.”).
111. See generally Michigan v. Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians, 
737 F.3d 1075 (6th Cir. 2013). 
112. See Michigan Indian Land Claims Settlement Act, Pub. L. 105-143, § 
108(f), 111 Stat. 2652, 2661-62 (1997) (“Any lands acquired using amounts from 
interest or other income of the Self-Sufficiency Fund shall be held in trust by the 
Secretary for the benefit of the tribe.”).
113. See id.  
114. See generally Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 134 S. Ct. 2024 
(2014). 
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of the tribe’s off-reservation land is plausible, if doubtful.115 Tribe B 
plans instead, as a back up to the possible failure of the legal theory, 
to simply open up the casino on rural land off-reservation and force 
its adversaries to take legal action to stop them. In-house counsel, 
sovereignty warriors one and all, advise the tribal council (the tribal 
client) that if the state or another tribe sues to shut down the casino, 
Tribe B’s sovereign immunity will act as a shield to the legal actions. 
And if the federal government—against which Tribe B is not 
immune—sues, in-house counsel believes that through a quirk in 
federal Indian law, the federal government does not have jurisdiction 
to sue the tribe to shut down the casino. 
In-house counsel is right, at least for a time. While Tribe B 
initially suffers a loss at the federal district court level to the State 
and another Indian tribe, and is forced to shut down the casino, the 
federal court of appeals reverses on exactly the legal theory in-house 
counsel has devised. Luckily for Tribe B, the federal government has 
chosen not to intervene. Unfortunately for Tribe B, the State seeks 
Supreme Court review of the appellate decision, and the Court grants 
certiorari. 
Until this point, Tribe B and its in-house counsel have limited 
the utilization of outside counsel. However, litigation before the 
Supreme Court is one of the most specialized areas of law, with just 
a few dozen lawyers in the world that can claim to be a member of 
the so-called “Supreme Court bar.” Tribe B and its sovereignty 
warriors reluctantly concede that it is prudent to seek specialized 
Supreme Court counsel. Tribe B interviews several candidates and 
settles on an attorney with an outstanding track record of prevailing 
against incredible odds at the Supreme Court, but who has never 
argued an Indian law matter before. 
Meanwhile, tribal leaders from other tribes as well as leaders of 
national tribal advocacy groups plead with the tribal leadership of 
Tribe B to concede the matter. The State’s petition for a writ of 
certiorari, in part, concedes that perhaps Tribe B’s immunity defense 
is a winning position, and that the only way for the State to shut 
down the casino is for the Supreme Court to reconsider the doctrine 
of tribal sovereign immunity and abrogate the tribe’s immunity as a 
matter of common law. These outside tribal interests argue with a 
great deal of force that the Supreme Court is not sympathetic to tribal 
                                                     
115. See Michigan Indian Land Claims Settlement Act § 107(a)(3) (“Any 
land acquired with funds from the Land Trust shall be held as Indian lands are 
held.”).
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interests at all and has not been for decades. Tribal interests suffer a 
terrible win rate before the Roberts Court116 and about a 20% win rate 
since the mid-1980s.117 Moreover, in 1998, the Supreme Court listed 
several serious policy objections to the continued viability of the 
doctrine of sovereign immunity and may be looking for a vehicle to 
rein in the doctrine, if not significantly abrogate tribal immunity.118
Finally, it is gospel that the Supreme Court usually grants cert. with 
an eye toward reversal of the lower court decision; the 65%-70% 
reversal rate attests to this common understanding.119
Perhaps because the personal pleas from tribal leaders and 
advocates around the nation strike a chord with the tribal leadership 
of Tribe B, in-house counsel asks outside counsel for its opinion. 
Outside counsel reminds the tribal client of the incredible successes 
he earned before the Court and guarantees that Tribe B will prevail 
before the Court. 
This is bullshit. 
Again, I intend use of the term bullshit in the manner 
championed by philosophers like Professor Frankfurt. Here, I argue 
that promising a tribal client a win before the Supreme Court, given 
the objective and subjective factors pointing to almost 
insurmountable odds of victory, is simply bullshit. In this 
hypothetical, outside counsel has “act[ed] coercively into our 
reasoning process by using irrelevant facts or assertions, and by 
telling half truths in such a way that we feel forced to ‘complete’ the 
story in a way that interest the opponent, perhaps contrary to our own 
interests.”120
                                                     
116. See Supreme Court, TURTLE TALK, http://turtletalk.wordpress.com/ 
resources/supreme-court-indian-law-cases (last visited Nov. 2, 2015) (collecting all 
Indian law cases decided by the Supreme Court since 1958). The Roberts Court has 
issued substantive opinions on ten Indian law cases, nine of them against tribal 
interests. The sole exception is Salazar v. Ramah Navajo Chapter, 132 S. Ct. 2181
(2012). 
117. See Carpenter & Wald, supra note 13, at 3136 (citing David H. Getches, 
Beyond Indian Law: The Rehnquist Court’s Pursuit of States’ Rights, Color-Blind 
Justice and Mainstream Values, 86 MINN. L. REV. 267, 280-81 (2001)). 
118. See Kiowa Tribe v. Mfg. Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751 (1998). 
119. See LEE EPSTEIN ET AL., THE SUPREME COURT COMPENDIUM: DATA,
DECISIONS, AND DEVELOPMENTS 271 (5th ed. 2012). 
120. Walter Carnielli, On a Theoretical Analysis of Deceiving: How to Resist 
a Bullshit Attack, in 314 STUDIES IN COMPUTATIONAL INTELLIGENCE: MODEL-BASED 
REASONING IN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY: ABDUCTION, LOGIC, AND
COMPUTATIONAL DISCOVERY 291, 292 (Lorenzo Magnani, Walter Carnielli & 
Claudio Pizzi eds., 2010). 
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Perhaps because national advocates for tribal interests make 
public their deep concerns about the risks of catastrophe for Indian 
tribes all over, several members of Tribe B call a general council 
meeting to vote on whether Tribe B should concede the case. During 
the general council meeting, tribal leaders argue that to concede the 
case amounts to a waiver of the tribe’s sovereignty, perhaps 
intentionally confusing the notions of tribal sovereign immunity and 
tribal sovereignty as a tool to both embolden support for the tribal 
client’s position and to undermine the credibility of its political 
opponents. In-house counsel backs tribal leadership and alleges that 
the political opponents have a pecuniary interest in the tribe backing 
down. 
These representations, too, are bullshit. 
Tribal sovereignty is much broader than tribal sovereign 
immunity, and to waive tribal immunity is not the same as waiving 
the full extent of the sovereignty of the tribe. To intentionally 
confuse these points in order to defeat political opposition to a legal 
position is bullshit. To allege that political opponents have a 
financial stake in the tribe’s opposition without any regard to the 
truth of that allegation for the purpose of undermining the credibility 
of the opposition also is bullshit. 
Did this actually happen in the run up to Michigan v. Bay Mills 
Indian Community? Did outside counsel promise a win? Did in-
house counsel and tribal leadership employ bullshit to defeat a 
challenge to the tribe’s legal position by the general council? Did in-
house counsel express grave doubts about the strategy to the tribal 
client in private, but support the strategy in public? 
How the hell should I know? 
But for purposes of this paper, I think it is a very useful 
exercise to assume that a scenario like this can and does occur. 
In the real world, the Supreme Court issued an opinion 
affirming the Sixth Circuit and roundly reaffirming the immunity of 
the Bay Mills Indian Community from suit.121 For the Bay Mills 
                                                     
121. The Court’s decision was 5–4, came with numerous caveats; for 
example, observers believe Congress will take up the matter of tribal sovereign 
immunity in coming sessions and that the Court will have numerous opportunities to 
reexamine tribal immunity in the contexts of tort claims and payday lending. E.g.,
Thomas F. Gede, Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Community—Post Decision 
SCOTUScast, THE FEDERALIST SOC’Y (June 2, 2014), http://www.fed-soc.org/ 
publications/detail/michigan-v-bay-mills-indian-community-post-decision-scotuscast;
Amy Howe, Opinion Details: Victory for Native American Tribes . . . for Now?,
SCOTUSBLOG (May 27, 2014, 12:01 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/05/ 
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Indian Community, however, the Supreme Court victory has not 
translated into more secure gaming opportunities. As of this writing, 
the tribe has not reopened its Vanderbilt casino nor attempted to 
develop its Port Huron property.122
For the Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians, however, 
the decision has opened the door for even more ambitious off-
reservation gaming proposals. In addition to the Lansing proposal, 
the Sault Tribe proposed a new casino on lands near the Detroit 
airport in Wayne County, Michigan.123 Was Bay Mills bankrupting 
itself financially and politically to win a Supreme Court victory on 
the bullshit advice of counsel while Sault Tribe kept its financial and 
political assets in reserve for a later date? Unless Bay Mills’ current 
strategy is to quietly negotiate all the particulars of a Port Huron or 
other off-reservation casino with the State and other players, it sure 
looks like Sault Tribe has played the better hand, with Bay Mills 
winning a classic Pyrrhic victory. 
What to do? 
III.THE ROLE OF IN-HOUSE COUNSEL IN DEALING WITH BULLSHIT:
STRATEGIES AND OBLIGATIONS
The problem as I see it is that there is an enormous structural 
and professional burden on in-house counsel for Indian tribes. 
Counsel must learn to identify bullshit from outside counsel and the 
tribal client. Counsel must retain independence of thought from the 
tribal client. In-house counsel must stay away from piling on its own 
bullshit. And in-house counsel must be courageous, motivated to 
fight back against bullshit, perhaps even at the expense of one’s own 
tribal employment. It is unlikely attorneys will be accountable 
                                                                                                               
opinion-details-victory-for-native-american-tribes-for-now/; Ryan Seelau & Ian 
Record, The Bay Mills Case: An Opportunity for Native Nations, INDIAN COUNTRY 
TODAY MEDIA NETWORK (June 24, 2014), http://indiancountrytodaymedianetwork. 
com/2014/06/24/bay-mills-case-opportunity-native-nations. 
122. In-house counsel for the tribe suggested at a conference on the Supreme 
Court’s decision and its aftermath in September 2014 that the tribal council no 
longer wished to pursue high-risk gaming opportunities, and would wait to see how 
the State of Michigan would proceed in the matter. 
123. Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Sault Tribe Lansing Casino Trust Application 
Documents, TURTLE TALK (June 11, 2014), http://turtletalk.wordpress.com/2014/06/ 
11/sault-tribe-lansing-casino-trust-application-documents/; Matthew L.M. Fletcher, 
Sault Tribe Huron Township, Wayne County Trust Application Documents, TURTLE 
TALK (June 11, 2014), https://turtletalk.wordpress.com/2014/06/11/sault-tribe-
huron-township-wayne-county-trust-application-documents/.  
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through malpractice claims or the state bar disciplinary process for 
bullshitting unless the attorney’s statements enter into the realm of 
misrepresentation and outright lies.124 In-house counsel must be 
ready for a change in paradigm. 
A. Fighting Self-Deception 
“Self-deception” is the biggest threat to in-house counsel’s
obligation to provide a balanced and informed opinion of the tribal 
counsel’s chance to prevail in litigation: “Awareness of th[e self-
deception] hazard is our only safeguard against falling into bullshit 
attack.”125 When bringing logical principles into my analysis of 
advising the tribal client, I borrow Brazilian logician Walter 
Carnielli’s analysis of self-deception—and he in turn borrows from 
Russian chess Grandmaster Xavier Tartacover: 
A chess game is divided into three stages: the first, when you hope you 
have the advantage, the second when you believe you have an advantage, 
and the third . . . when you know you’re going to lose!126
It is my view that in-house counsel should always assume tribal 
interests will lose in litigation. And in-house counsel is obligated to 
make the tribal client aware of the worst-case scenario. 
In the off-reservation gaming hypotheticals above, Tribe A and 
Tribe B have engaged in similar lines of legal strategy, with Tribe A 
fully aware of the limited probability of their ultimate success in 
reaching the goal of opening a casino in Lansing. But Tribe B may 
have fallen into a logical trap—perhaps the conjunction fallacy, 
where the tribal client and its attorneys have violated a basic rule of 
probability: “the fact that the probability of the intersection of events 
(that is, their conjunction) cannot exceed the probabilities of the 
constituent events.”127 Like Grandmaster Tartacover, Tribe B initially 
believes the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act and the tribe’s gaming 
compact with Michigan do not abrogate the tribe’s immunity from 
                                                     
124. Cf. Bridgeman & Sandrik, supra note 2, at 381 (recognizing that 
bullshit promises in contract negotiations and terms are not actionable under the 
doctrine of promissory fraud). 
125. Carnielli, supra note 120, at 297. 
126. Id. 
127. Gary Charness, Edi Karni & Dan Levin, On the Conjunction Fallacy in 
Probability Judgment: New Experimental Evidence Regarding Linda, 68 GAMES &
ECON. BEHAV. 551, 551 (2010) (citing Amos Tversy & Daniel Kahneman, 
Extensional Versus Intuitive Reasoning: The Conjunction Fallacy in Probability 
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the State of Michigan’s suit; Tribe B then hopes the Supreme Court 
will not use its common law authority to abrogate off-reservation 
tribal immunity; but Tribe B ultimately relies on a promise from 
outside counsel that Tribe B will win in the Supreme Court. These 
“errors are substantially reduced by . . . consultation.”128 Tribe A’s
outside counsel presented probabilistic advice is more in line with 
the reality of federal Indian law than Tribe B’s outside counsel. This 
should be the goal of in-house counsel—to ensure that such advice is 
provided to the tribal client. 
B. Exposing Economic Self-Interest & The Problem of the Supreme 
Court Bar 
Another possible avenue for conscientious in-house attorneys 
to pursue is to highlight the economic self-interest of outside 
counsel. Outside counsel, as noted above, is profit-driven and 
benefits from pursuing dangerous or doomed appeals regardless of 
the outcome. 
In the analogous context of lying to clients (which is not our 
concern here), commentators suggest two lines of potential 
regulation, the first regulatory and the second moral. Professor Lisa 
Lerman recommended in 1990 that deceiving clients for economic 
self-interest should be prohibited.129 Professor Carrie Menkel-
Meadow recommended a broader rule akin to the golden rule—
“lawyers should in all respects deal with their clients in the way they 
themselves would want to be treated if they were in the client’s
position.”130 Mind you, both commentators are talking about lying, 
where this paper is confined to the more complicated question of 
bullshit—but the analogy is strong. Professor Menkel-Meadow’s
golden rule is not particularly helpful, for instance, in the case of a 
corporate board of directors (such as a tribal council) that 
affirmatively seeks a bullshit answer from outside counsel in order to 
deal with unruly shareholders (or tribal general council or 
membership). Regulating economic self-interest moves us closer to 
dealing with the problem of bullshit by outside counsel to the tribal 
client. 
                                                     
128. Charness, Karni & Levin, supra note 127, at 552. 
129. See Lerman, supra note 1, at 685 (“Self-interested deception of clients 
by lawyers should be prohibited.”).
130. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Lying to Clients for Economic Gain or 
Paternalistic Judgment: A Proposal for a Golden Rule of Candor, 138 U. PA. L.
REV. 761, 764 (1990). 
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A relatively easy inquiry for in-house counsel to advise the 
tribal client in the context of the establishment of the attorney–client 
privilege between the tribal client and outside counsel the extent of 
the economic self-interest of outside counsel. Is outside counsel 
entitled to payment, win or lose? Even if outside counsel is working 
pro bono or at a substantially reduced rate, exactly how does outside 
counsel financially benefit from the representation of the tribal 
client? In my view, this is nothing more than due diligence but still 
an obligatory act on the part of in-house counsel, especially in 
relation to Supreme Court specialists. 
C. Toward an In-House Counsel Bar Association 
From my experience as in-house counsel for four different 
Indian tribes, I applaud the establishment of the Tribal In-House 
Counsel Association (TICA).131 The only people who can candidly 
talk to each other and offer informal advice about the ethical 
complexities facing in-house counsel are others in the same position. 
The establishment of a specialized bar will provide inexperienced 
tribal counsel resources and advice on their new jobs as well. TICA 
is four years old and should fulfill this goal moving forward.132
One issue that can be addressed immediately is the information 
asymmetry that plagues Indian nations on the question of outside 
counsel. What is the market for outside counsel in handling 
specialized matters? What did Tribe C pay to Firm D to handle a tax 
dispute with the Internal Revenue Service? What did Tribe E pay to 
Firm F to defend a quiet title action brought by a local unit of 
government? What did Bay Mills pay its specialized counsel to 
handle its Supreme Court case? Beyond mere fees, who works well 
with the tribal client and tribal in-house counsel, making appropriate 
disclosures and keeping its clients informed? 
                                                     
131. Dale White, former in-house counsel for the Mohegan Tribe, mentioned 
the creation of a small organization of in-house attorneys of gaming tribes more than 
a decade ago, so this is not a new idea. See White, supra note 58, at 510 (“I have 
tried to form a tribal in-house attorney group as well, made up of gaming tribes. The 
Mashantucket Pequots, the Grande Ronde Tribe in Oregon, the Prairie Band 
Pottawatomi Nation in Kansas, and the Ho-Chunk Tribe in Wisconsin are some of 
the tribes who are participating.”).
132. TRIBAL IN-HOUSE COUNSEL ASSOCIATION, http://www.tribalinhouse 
counsel.com/ (last visited Dec. 3, 2015) (“TICA was formed in 2012 . . . .”). 
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D. Tribal Attorney Regulation 
Indian tribes have remarkable regulatory authority over 
nonmembers that do business within tribal boundaries.133 But 
relatively few tribal governments regulate attorney activities within 
reservation borders.134 More tribes should. 
Indian nations could enact procurement procedures on retaining 
outside counsel—much like state and local governments do—share 
information with each other on the quality and cost of private firms 
with which they do business, and enact professional responsibility 
regulations that impose tribal cultural norms on all attorneys who 
represent the tribe or its entities. 
CONCLUSION
The driving force behind this paper is that tribal interests fare 
very badly in Supreme Court litigation. Counsel for Indian tribes 
must recognize the legal and political impediments tribal interests 
face before the nine Justices. Unlike the federal and state 
governments, tribal governments have little structural protection 
expressed in the United States Constitution, putting tribal interests in 
a deep hole in any matters involving disputes with federal, state, and 
local governments. Moreover, much of federal Indian law is judge-
made common law, putting the Supreme Court in a position to act as 
a policy court, but apparently not a super-legislature.135 Wins and 
losses tell one story—one where tribal interests prevail just a couple 
times a decade in the current Supreme Court136—but a more 
important and useful story is that tribal interests have options. 
                                                     
133. E.g., Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130 (1982) (taxation); 
New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324 (1983) (hunting and fishing 
licenses); Dolgencorp, Inc. v. Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians, 746 F.3d 167 
(5th Cir. 2014) (tribal court jurisdiction over tort claims against business), cert. 
granted, 135 S. Ct. 2833 (2015).  
134. Wenona T. Singel, Address, Michigan State University Indigenous Law 
and Policy Center/Tribal In-House Counsel Association Conference (Nov. 6, 2015), 
https://turtletalk.files.wordpress.com/2015/03/15-ip-35-program-comp3-2_page_2.jpg. 
135. Cf. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965) (“We do not sit 
as a super-legislature to determine the wisdom, need, and propriety of laws that 
touch economic problems, business affairs, or social conditions.”); Day-Brite 
Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421, 423 (1952) (“[W]e do not sit as a super-
legislature to weigh the wisdom of legislation nor to decide whether the policy 
which it expresses offends the public welfare.”).
136. The Roberts Court, so far, has issued substantive opinions on eleven 
Indian law cases, nine of them decided against tribal interests. See Supreme Court,
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A few years back, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in 
Madison County v. Oneida Indian Nation of New York, a tribal 
sovereign immunity case.137 After the Court granted certiorari, the 
tribe enacted legislation to waive its immunity and moot the case; a 
strategy that worked in that the Court dismissed the matter.138 In the 
off-reservation gaming hypotheticals discussed here, attorneys 
should be aware of the possibility that even cases on the brink of 
decision by the Supreme Court can be thwarted.  
Bullshit, however, has the potential to undermine foundations 
of law that so many Indian tribes depend on—doctrines like tribal 
sovereign immunity and other aspects of inherent tribal authority, the 
federal trust responsibility, and congressional plenary power. At any 
given moment, bullshit is beneficial to Indian country actors ranging 
from tribal elected leaders, outside counsel, and in-house counsel. 
Politics is riddled with bullshit, and Indian country is riddled with 
politics. 
In sum, in-house counsel has a unique problem—pressures 
from the tribal client and from outside counsel to pursue strategies 
that are risky, justified by bullshit, the most difficult form of 
deception to overcome—and difficult impediments to respond to 
them. In-house counsel is the best job in the world. 
Miigwetch. 
                                                                                                               
supra note 116. The exceptions are Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 134 S. Ct.
2024 (2014), and Salazar v. Ramah Navajo Chapter, 132 S. Ct. 2181 (2012). In 
2004 and 2005, tribal interests prevailed twice—in United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 
193 (2004), and Cherokee Nation v. Leavitt, 543 U.S. 631 (2005). 
137. 562 U.S. 42 (2011).  
138. See id. at 42-43. 
